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THE GRAVITATIONAL FORCE OF ORIGINALISM
RANDY E. BARNETT*
ABSTRACT: In Part I of this essay, prepared for the Fordham conference on “The New
Originalism and Constitutional Law,” I describe four aspects of the New
Originalism: (1) The New Originalism is about identifying the original public
meaning of the Constitution rather then the original framers intent; (2) The
interpretive activity of identifying the original public meaning of the text is a purely
descriptive empirical inquiry; (3) But there is also a normative tenet of the New
Originalism that contends that the original public meaning of the text should be
followed; (4) Distinguishing between the activities of interpretation and construction
identifies the limit of the New Originalism, which is only a theory of interpretation.
In Part II, I then discuss how originalism can influence the outcome of such cases as
D.C. v. Heller, McDonald v. Chicago, and NFIB v. Sebelius. I suggest that, so long
as there are justices who accept the relevance of original meaning, originalism can
exert a kind of “gravitational force” on legal doctrine even when, as in McDonald
and NFIB, the original meaning of the Constitution appears not to be the basis of a
judicial decision.
INTRODUCTION
The New Originalism has made quite a splash since my essay, “An
Originalism for Nonoriginalists” appeared in 1999.1 To a remarkable degree
constitutional scholars in recent years, especially younger ones, have grasped its basic
tenets even if they do not find themselves in complete agreement with the approach.
In this essay, I will summarize the main features of the New Originalism and explain
why originalism has proven to be significant in litigation, even in cases in which
original meaning is not being debated or seems wholly irrelevant.
In Part I, I describe what is distinctive about the New Originalism. First, the
New Originalism is about identifying the original public meaning of the Constitution
and not the original framers intent. The New Originalism stands for the proposition
that “the meaning of a written constitution should remain the same until it’s properly
changed.” Second, I will explain that the interpretive activity of identifying the
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original public meaning of the text is an empirical inquiry. Third, I want to discuss
the normative justification for following the original public meaning of the text.
Fourth and finally I want to identify the limits of originalism by distinguishing two
distinct activities: First, the activity of “constitutional interpretation” that seeks to
identify the communicative content of the text and, second, the activity of
“constitutional construction” that seeks to supply the implementing rules and
procedures by which this content can be applied to particular cases and controversies.
Then, in Part II, I discuss how and why originalism seems to influence the
outcome of cases in which it appears to be playing no role – cases such as the
constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act. In this Part, I suggest that
originalism has a kind of “gravitational force” that affects legal doctrine in significant
ways. Or at least that this force can affect such doctrine even when the original
meaning of the Constitution appears not to be the basis of a judicial decision
provided there are justices who accept the relevance of originalism.
I. WHAT IS THE NEW ORIGINALISM?
A. Original Public Meaning v. Original Framers’ Intent
The Old Originalism purported to interpret the text of the Constitution
according to the intentions of its framers. This approach was subject to two
objections that I, for one, found persuasive: The first was the practical. How do you
systematically identify what a diverse group of people thought about any particular
issue? As a result of this problem of “collective intent,” and because new
constitutional cases typically involved factual situations unknown to the framers, old
originalists typically engaged in a hypothetical and counter-factual inquiry into how
the framers would have addressed an issue had they thought of it. Back before I was
an originalist, I called this “channeling the framers”– as in “Oh Framers, would you
think the thermal imaging of a house to detect increased heat generated by marijuana
cultivation is a ‘search’?”2
The second concern was normative. Why exactly should we the living, here
today, be bound by the framers intentions? I called this the “Framers as Wardens”
model, but it was more commonly called the “dead hand” problem – as in “what
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justification is there for us to be ruled by the dead hand of the past?”3 For these
reasons, I and others declined to become originalists.
Then along came the New Originalism.4 Rather than attempt to identify some
collective intentions of the framers, the New Originalism looked to identify the
original public meaning of the words of the text. In other words, it seeks the meaning
actually communicated to the public by the words on the page. This is like the
objective or “reasonable” meaning of a contract at the time of its formation. Such an
inquiry looks to three different sources of communicative content of language:
First it looks to the semantic meaning of the words on the page.5 For
example, what was the generally accepted meaning of the word “commerce” at the
time of its enactment? Did the word “arms” in the Second Amendment refer to
weapons, or did it refer to the limbs to which our arms are attached?
Second, it looks to constitutional implicature, or what the semantic meaning
of the Constitution implies in fact.6 For example, the Ninth Amendment says that
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.”7
For the sake of argument, assume that the historical evidence establishes that
the original sematic meaning of “rights ... retained by the people” was natural rights,
by which was meant liberty rights.8 Even so, the Ninth Amendment is literally just
a rule of construction that expressly enjoins one, and only one, particular
constitutional construction: any claim that, because some rights have been
3

Id. at 403-407 (describing the model of “framers as wardens”).
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The phrase “New Originalism” was coined by Keith Whittington, one of its principal
architects. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004).
5
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Solum. See e.g. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (November 22, 2008). Illinois Public Law
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implicature).
7

See id. at 622-26 (explaining implicature in the context of the Ninth Amendment). The next
several paragraphs summarizes the analysis presented there.
8

See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1
(2006); and Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937 (2008).

Randy E. Barnett

Gravitational Force of Originalism

Page 4

enumerated, another unenumerated right may be denied or disparaged. Or, to put it
another way, a right that is not enumerated may not be denied or disparaged on the
grounds that other rights were enumerated. (By the way, I think this is exactly what
Footnote Four of U.S. v. Carolene Products does.9)
The Ninth Amendment does not actually expressly state that there are “other
rights” and that these other rights may not be denied or disparaged.10 But the original
meaning of the Ninth Amendment implies more than what it expressly says. In
particular, it implies, first, that there are rights that are retained by the people and,
second, that these rights should not be denied or disparaged. The rule of construction
included in the Constitution would make no sense – and its presence in the first ten
amendments would be inexplicable – except on the assumption that there are rights
retained by the people that ought not be denied or disparaged. Taken together, then,
these two implied propositions enjoin the denial or disparagement of natural rights,
even where such a denial is not being justified on the grounds that other rights were
enumerated. This is the reason why so many who read the text of the Ninth
Amendment think it is saying exactly this. Because it is, just not expressly.
Of course, such a meaning might have been communicated expressly rather
than by implication. To see how, consider the following provision that was proposed
by Representative Roger Sherman as a member of the House Select Committee
tasked with drafting amendments that became what we now call the Bill of Rights:
“The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they enter
into Society. . . . Of these rights therefore they Shall not be deprived by the
Government of the united States.”11 Although Sherman’s proposal is not what the

9

See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[t]here may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments....” [emphases added]).
10

In this sense, a more accurate, though less pithy, title for my Texas Law Review article,
supra at note 8, would have been: “The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says Expressly and What
it Implies in Fact.” The point of the concept of implicature is that one is really “saying” what is
implicated, in the sense of actually communicating the unexpressed message.
11

Roger Sherman’s Draft of the Bill of Rights, in RANDY E. BARNETT, 1 THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 351 (1989). The
omitted portion of Sherman’s proposal (indicated by the ellipses) gave a nonexclusive list of examples
of these individual natural “retained” rights:
Such are the rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring property, and
of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their
Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their
common good, and of applying to Government by petition or remonstrance for
redress of grievances.
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Ninth Amendment eventually said expressly, the words of the Amendment imply to
a normal speaker of English both the existence of natural rights that are retained by
the people and an injunction against the deprivation of those rights, while making a
further point about how not to read the Bill of Rights. In other words, Sherman’s
proposal is part of the original—implied-in-fact—meaning of the Ninth Amendment.
Or so I contend.
Finally, to ascertain the original public meaning of the text, the New
Originalism looks to the publicly available communicative context of these words to
resolve problems of ambiguity.12 For example, when Article IV empowers the
government of the United States “to . . . protect . . . [every state] . . . against domestic
violence,”13 the publicly available context reveals this to be a reference to riots not
spouse abuse. Publicly available context might also explain why, although the
Constitution does not expressly reference slavery as a purely semantic matter, the
public would know that the words “other persons” in the Three Fifth’s Clause of
Article I, Section 2 was a reference to slaves.14
So my first point about the New Originalism is that it seeks the original public
meaning of the text rather than the original framers intent. This means that the New
Originalism is more practical than the old originalism insofar as it seeks to establish
an empirical fact about the objective meaning of the text at a particular point in time,
rather than a counterfactual reconstruction of the subjective intentions of an
individual or group.

Id.
12

See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, __ Fordham
L. Rev. ___, ___ (2013) (“Public meaning Originalists believe that the communicative content of the
constitutional text is fixed at the time of origin by the conventional semantic meaning of the words and
phrases in the context that was shared by the drafters, ratifiers, and citizens.”).
13

U.S. CONST. ART. IV, Sec. 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against
domestic Violence.”).
14

Although some “constitutional abolitionists,” such as Lysander Spooner, argued to the
contrary, most others, like Salmon P. Chase, accepted the contextual evidence of original public
meaning. See Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 165 (2011); Randy E. Barnett, From Antislavery Lawyer
to Chief Justice: The Remarkable and Largely Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase, 63 CASE
WESTERN L. REV. (forthcoming).
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B. Originalism’s Descriptive Claim: Identifying Original Public Meaning is an
Empirical Inquiry
Which brings me to my second point about the New Originalism. It seeks to
discover an empirical fact about the world.15 Because we are so accustomed to
thinking that our choice of interpretations is normative – which in a sense it is – it is
important for me to stress that the New Originalism seeks to identify what a
reasonable speaker of English would have understood the words of the text to mean
at the time of its enactment. This is as much an empirical inquiry as it would be to
ascertain what the words I am now using mean today.
When we choose to use language, the meaning of our words is determined by
the social practice or convention that is language. We can hold whatever private
idiosyncratic meaning of words we may wish in our minds. But unless we disclose
our idiosyncratic meanings to others – or the communicative context suggests
otherwise – the words we choose to use will convey the conventional meaning that
ordinarily attaches to these words. So “yes” ordinarily means yes to a normal speaker
of English, and “no” means no, despite our secret desire or wish that “yes” means no,
or perhaps even that “yes” means yellow.
This is important to keep in mind because the empirical nature of the inquiry
entails that it can potentially be resolved by appeals to evidence. This is not to say
that the objective meaning of words is always discoverable. Sometimes there are
ambiguities in linguistic usage that cannot be resolved. But if language is to work,
this is likely to be a relatively rare occurrence. And, more importantly, when
confronting conflicting interpretive claims about meaning, there is (á la Gertrude
Stein) a there there potentially to resolve the conflict.
When faced with whether “domestic violence” in Article IV refers to riots or
spouse abuse, or whether the word “arms” in the Second Amendment refers to
weapons or the limbs to which our hands are attached, we are making a claim about
reality, not merely a statement of our normative preferences. This is the reason why
so much of the Constitution, such as how many senators are allotted to each state, is
so uncontroversial. The objective original public meaning of what Sandy Levinson
has called the “hard-wired” parts of the Constitution is simply so clear that its
meaning can rarely even be questioned.16
Given the empirical nature of ascertaining original public meaning, the New
Originalism ought to be practiced more rigorously than was the old originalism.

15

It was Larry Solum’s seminal work on “semantic originalism” that first made this point so
clearly. See Solum, supra note 5.
16

See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 107 (2008)
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Historians, for example, were often critical of originalist scholarship for “cherrypicking” quotes to support one’s views, so that “I say Madison said X, you say
Hamilton said Y,” now what? Some anti-originalist historians also objected that
intentions are just too hard to identify with enough specificity to resolve a current
case or controversy – though this has not prevented these same nonoriginalist
historians from filing amicus briefs asserting their own opinions about the original
intentions behind, say, the right to keep and bear arms, or the power to regulate
commerce among the several states.
In contrast, establishing the semantic meaning of the words in the text, given
the publically available context, requires a survey of relevant usage. The search for
original public meaning should be as systematic and comprehensive as possible with
respect to any source one surveys, reporting deviant as well as predominate usage.
For example, in my article on the original meaning of the Commerce Clause in the
University of Chicago Law Review,17 I surveyed every use of the term “commerce”
at the Philadelphia convention, the Federalist Papers, and the ratification debates.
Then, in a sequel in the Arkansas Law Review,18 I added a comprehensive survey of
all 1500-plus uses of the term “commerce” in the Pennsylvania Gazette over an 85
year period. I found that, contrary to my expectation, usage of the word “commerce”
was remarkably uniform.
We are searching for an empirical fact: What information would these words
on the page have conveyed to the reasonable speaker of English in the relevant
audience at the time of enactment? In this inquiry, the linguistic usage by opponents
as well as proponents of the Constitution is relevant, as are even private letters.
C. Originalism’s Normative Claim: We Should Follow Original Meaning
Third, having stressed that the original public meaning is an empirically
objective fact, I now want to acknowledge that the New Originalism does also make
a normative claim and it is this: the original meaning of the text provides the law that
legal decision makers are bound by or ought to follow. This is a normative and not
a description claim, which then poses the normative question: Just why should we
follow the communicative content of the Constitution at the time of its enactment?

17

See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101 (2001).
18

See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55
ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003)
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New Originalists do not all give the same answer to this question,19 so let me
briefly summarize mine. I start with the proposition that the Constitution was put in
writing so it could provide the law that governs those who govern us. A written
constitution cannot serve this purpose if the very people who are to be governed by
it can themselves, alone or in combination, alter the meaning of the constraints
imposed upon them. None of us can alter the meaning of the statutes or regulations
imposed upon us without going through the amendment process, and neither can our
rulers, who are supposed to be our agents.
As John Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison:
The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits
may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may at any time be passed by those
intended to be restrained?20

But you don’t have to take John Marshall or my word on the subject. The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution in Article VI provides that “This Constitution
. . . shall be the supreme law of the land.”21 For present purposes, of greatest
importance is the reference to “this Constitution.” This is a direct reproach to those
who think that “the Constitution” is a broader concept, which may or may not include
the text of the written constitution. No, the Constitution that is the supreme law of
the land is this one, the written one, not a constitution provided by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
The Supremacy Clause then expressly says that “the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby,” which means that the text of the Constitution is the “law of
the land” that binds state judges[, who under the original Constitution were the only
lower courts to consider federal question cases unless and until Congress established
inferior federal courts]. Article VI then goes on to say more about who is bound by

19

Keith Whittington, for example, grounds his commitment to original meaning on popular
sovereignty. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110-159 (1999). My own views on popular sovereignty have
evolved as I discovered the concept of individual popular sovereignty that existed at the time of the
Founding. See Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State? Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1179 (2007). As I intend to explain in the future, I now think that popular
sovereignty is entirely consistent with grounding the normative basis for originalism on the protection
of natural rights.
20

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).

21

U.S. CONST., Art. VI.
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“this Constitution”: “The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both
of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation,
to support this Constitution.”22
So this Constitution is the law that governs those who govern us. And this
Constitution cannot serve this purpose of those who are supposed to be governed by
it – including federal and state judges – can, on their own, change the rules that apply
to them.
Indeed, one succinct way to define the New Originalism is the proposition
noted above in the Introduction: that the express and implied public meaning of the
words on the page should remain the same until properly changed. And the proper
way to change “this Constitution” is provided in Article V. Judges are not allowed
to update the text of the Constitution by changing the meaning it had at the time of
enactment.
Let me conclude this section by noting that, to the extent we are engaging in
a normative debate about how we ought to interpret the Constitution, the burden of
persuasion does not rest solely on originalists. Nonoriginalists should also be able
to articulate how they think “this Constitution” should be interpreted and why. For
example, just why do they think we are stuck with two Senators per state
notwithstanding that so much has changed since the Founding, including views of
democracy and the need for one-man one-vote. On their theory of interpretation,
why can’t judges just update the number of Senators each state gets? To paraphrase
what Jeff Foxworthy says about rednecks, when a nonoriginalist undertakes to
answer this question seriously, in the end, he or she just might be a New Originalist.
D. The Limits of Originalism: Interpretation v. Construction
Having insisted that the meaning of “this Constitution” is the publicly
available meaning at the time of enactment, I wish now to stress that the New
Originalism is then far more modest than the old originalism about the amount of
information actually conveyed by the words on the page – even when broadened to
include publicly available context and constitutional implicature. The New
Originalism takes seriously the distinction between ambiguity and vagueness of
language.23
Language is ambiguous when it has more than one sense. When one says
“this feather is light,” one might be referring to its weight or one might be referring
22

Id.

23

This section summarizes the analysis presented in RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE
LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89-130 (2004).
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to its color. But, unless one is being poetic, one does not ordinarily mean both at the
same time. In contrast, language is vague insofar as it has a core meaning that is
clear, but a penumbral meaning where it may not be clear whether or not it applies
to a particular object. So a white feather is clearly a light feather, and a black feather
is clearly not. But how dark a shade of grey a feather must be before we cease calling
it light and start calling it dark is not always clear.24
The New Originalism claims that, except for some special cases, ambiguity
can usually be resolved by reference to evidence of context. So context makes clear
that “arms” in the Second Amendment refers to weapons not the limbs to which our
hands are attached; “domestic violence” refers to riots not spouse abuse. With
respect to vagueness, however, the original meaning of the text can run out – by
which I mean, the text simply does not specify whether a particular item is in or out.
For example, whether a particular search is “reasonable” or a particular punishment
is “cruel.”
When original meaning runs out, constitutional “interpretation” strictly
speaking is over, and some new noninterpretive activity must supplement the
information revealed by interpretation. New Originalists refer to this activity as
“constitutional construction,” as distinct from “constitutional interpretation,”25 but
it does not matter what labels one applies to distinguish these two activities so long
as we recognize that they are two different activities.
For present purposes, the most important thing to note about constitutional
construction is that, while the activity of construction might be constrained by the
original meaning of the text, the activity of construction is needed precisely when that
communicative meaning is not sufficiently determinate to dictate a unique
application, so extra guidance must be supplied by some nonoriginalist methodology.
By adopting the interpretation-construction distinction, the New Originalism
frankly acknowledges that the text of “this Constitution” does not provide definitive
answers to all cases and controversies that come before Congress or the courts. In
this sense, the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution locked some things into their
text, and delegated other matters to future decision makers. While the Constitution
is the law that governs those who govern us, as we all know constraining government
officials was not its only purpose; the Constitution was enacted also to empower
them. The vague terms in the Constitution empower legislatures and judges to put
flesh on the bones of the text, provided they don’t break any of the bones. For
example, although the Constitution says nothing about “time, place, and manner”

24

See E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76. YALE L.J. 939, 953-56
(1967) (distinguishing linguistic ambiguity from vagueness).
25

This distinction and terminology was first introduced into the discussion of originalism by
Keith Whittington. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 19, at 6-7.
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regulations of speech, this body of constructed doctrine is an effort to flesh out the
contours of the rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly. Devising doctrine
to effectuate what this Constitution says does not violate a judge’s oath, it fulfills it.
Because the New Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation, how
constitutional construction is to be done is beyond the scope of originalism, except
to note that a construction is improper if it contradicts or undercuts what this
Constitution does say. So originalists can and do disagree on how extra-originalist
constitutional construction is to be done. This disagreement is often informed by
what each thinks makes a constitution legitimate and binding. So those who rest
constitutional legimacy on the “consent of the governed” might take one approach
to construction, while those who – like me – rest constitutional legitimacy on
effectively protecting the rights retained by the people might take another.
But, this open-endedness notwithstanding, I want to stress that the New
Originalism still has bite. Despite the fact that the original meaning of the text may
sometimes or even often be “underdeterminate,” this does not entail that it is wholly
indeterminate. The recent dispute between “living originalist” Jack Balkin and me
about the meaning of “commerce” in the Commerce Clause illustrates that it matters
a great deal whether the original meaning of “commerce” was the trade or
transportation of persons and things from one place to another, as I believe the
evidence shows; or “social interaction,” as Jack contends.26 And the fact Balkin and
I may disagree does not refute the claim that there was a fact of the matter we are
seeking to establish by resorting to evidence of usage. To repeat, with the New
Originalism, there is a there there. Interested third parties can read my articles, then
read Jack’s, then read my critique of his use and omission of evidence, then read his
reply. They can then reach their own conclusions about who is right.
II. THE GRAVITATIONAL FORCE OF ORIGINALISM
Of course, the New Originalism has developed a lot on the past fifteen years,
and continues to develop further. My goal in Part I was to provide a concise and
accessible overview of the current state of the art. But to this some may respond, “So
what?” Courts pay very little attention to original meaning, it might be said, and
even the conservatives on the Court seem little inclined to discuss it, much less
adhere to it. One response to this reaction is simply that it is far too court- or
litigation-centric; one’s view of constitutional interpretation should not be so
dependent on what judges may or may not think, or how they write their opinions.
26

Compare JACK BALKIN, LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 138-82 (2012) (claiming that
“commerce” originally meant “interaction” at the time of enactment); with Randy E. Barnett, Jack
Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 ILL. L. REV. 623 (denying that “commerce” meant
“interaction” at the time of enactment).
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Originalism claims to be the right way to read the Constitution for whoever cares to
read the Constitution accurately, be they legislators, judges, or citizens. If courts do
not adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution when they should, then
originalism serves the important purpose of providing a basis for normatively
critiquing their failure.
In this Part, however, I want to address this challenge on its own terms by
explaining why originalism does matter to courts and in litigation. My point is
simple and stems from the description of the New Originalism that I provided in Part
I. Originalism matters when lower courts, but especially when the Supreme Court,
are engaged in constitutional interpretation, properly limited to discussing the
meaning of the text of the Constitution.
One reason why this seems rare, is that 99.9% of constitutional cases, the
courts are not engaged in constitutional interpretation but are, instead, engaged in
interpreting the meaning – perhaps even the original meaning – of its previous
decisions or doctrines. In other words, because in 99.9% of constitutional cases,
courts are engaged in constitutional construction, they pay little heed to the text, and
how it should best be interpreted.
Once one understands the descriptive distinction between the activities of
interpretation and construction, and acknowledges that originalism is only a method
of interpretation, it becomes easy to see why the criticism that originalism is
generally ignored by courts is very wide of the mark. When courts, and especially
the Supreme Court, are engaged in interpretation strictly speaking, originalism
assumes center stage.
A. Writing on a Blank Slate: D.C. v. Heller
Consider District of Columbia v. Heller.27 Prior to Heller, the Supreme Court
had discussed the meaning of the Second Amendment at any length just once before,
in the ambiguous 1939 case of Miller v. U.S.28 Although I believe that Miller was
entirely consistent with interpreting the original. So, when the Supreme Court finally
decided to take up the issue in Heller, there was no precedent that clearly dictated the
result. Consequently, the justices were pretty much writing on a clean slate.

27

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

28

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). Although I believe that Miller was entirely
consistent with interpreting the original meaning of the Second Amendment as protecting an individual
right to arms, gun control proponents managed to sow enough doubt over the meaning of this opinion
that we might consider it to be ambiguous. Indeed, until the 2001 case of United States v. Emerson,
270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), every lower federal appellate court found that Miller had adopted a
collective rights reading of the amendment.
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Moreover, since the 1980s, a substantial body of scholarship had developed
examining the original meaning of the Amendment. And, the politics of the Second
Amendment was such that the Court could reach either decision without bringing
down the pillars of the temple.
So the default position of the justices was to decide on the basis of the
original meaning of the Second Amendment. The five in the majority explicitly
adopted an “original public meaning” approach to the text, carefully parsing the
sentence, clause by clause, word by word. “In interpreting this text,” wrote Justice
Scalia, “we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and
ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’”29 He then made it clear that
“[n]ormal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes
secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in
the founding generation.”30
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion was more ambiguous. On the one hand
he attempted to refute the original public meaning analysis of Justice Scalia.31 But
from this he then affirmatively appealed to original framers intent.32 Ironically, most
of the historians and law professors who filed briefs on behalf of the government
based their arguments on original framers intent, seemingly oblivious to the powerful
left-critique of this version of originalism in the 1980s that led to its abandonment
by most originalists.33 Apparently not really understanding the original public
meaning approach, or the interpretation-construction distinction, their originalist
analysis, along with Justice Stevens, was unresponsive to the New Originalist
analysis of the majority.
This was reminiscent of the old joke about how not to plead in the alternative
in criminal cases: “Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, my client who sits here before
29

554 U.S. at 576 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731 (1931) ).

30
Id. at 576-77. See also id. at 614, (post-Civil War debates “do not provide as much insight
into its original meaning as earlier sources.”); and id. at 625 “We conclude that nothing in our
precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment. ”).
31

See, e.g., id. at 649 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“The stand-alone phrase ‘bear arms’ most
naturally conveys a military meaning unless the addition of a qualifying phrase signals that a different
meaning is intended.”).
32

See id. at 667 n. 33, (“what is striking about the Court’s discussion is its failure to refute
Oliver's description of the meaning of the Amendment or the intent of its drafters.”).
33

See Brief of Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove, Saul Cornell, David T. Konig, William J.
Novak, Lois G. Schwoerer et al. in Support of Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
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you did not commit this crime; some one else did it. But if he did commit it, he was
insane at the time.” So, originalism is to be rejected because it is a fools errand to
reconstruct the collective intentions of those who framed, or perhaps those who
ratified, the original Constitution, much less the Congress who proposed the Second
Amendment and the state legislators who voted to ratify it. But, as it happens,
historians can offer their expert scholarly opinions that the right protected was a
collective right of states to have a militia, or an individual right to bear arms in a
militia, or whatever.
Heller represents a clear case of the “gravitational force” of originalism.34
Not only did the five justices in the majority join Justice Scalia’s explicitly originalist
opinion, but Justice Stevens never disputed that this was an appropriate basis to
decide the case. He merely purported to disagree with the originalist conclusions of
the majority. Though a bit more equivocal, Justice Breyer joined the opinion of
Justice Stevens, and purported to supplement it with an analysis of the proper
scrutiny to be used to evaluate gun laws. (Justice Breyer’s approach in dissent has
been well received by lower courts, which will necessitate a return engagement to the
Supreme Court.)
This is not to say that Justice Scalia’s opinion was without any flaws from an
originalist perspective. While his textual analysis was pretty state of the art, he then
qualified his conclusion in a much-noted passage in which he writes:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the
full scope of the Second Amendment , nothing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.35

I agree this passage is unsatisfactory. Why exactly are these laws all right under the
original meaning of the Amendment? It just seems ad hoc.
Without delving too deeply into this specific issue, let me offer the following
diagnosis of the problem. For all the importance of his role in developing and

34

By “gravitational force,” I am not making a Dworkinian claim about the analytic force or
pull of legal reasoning. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 121 (1977) (If Hercules
“classifies some event as a mistake, then he does not deny its specific authority but he does deny its
gravitational force, and cannot consistently appeal to that force in other arguments”). Instead, I am
making a socio-cultural claim about the influence of originalist interpretation on even nonoriginalist
doctrinal construction. But the ideas are similar.
35

554 U.S. at 626-27.
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promoting original public meaning originalism, Justice Scalia simply has not
internalized the distinction between interpretation and construction. Indeed, recently
he made clear his objection to making such a distinction.36
But this stance creates a problem for him. Because he has only one tool in his
tool box – original public meaning interpretation – he is forced to try to identify the
contours of the original public meaning of the individual right to arms so it excludes
these and other a laws.37 Such a move is appropriate if, and only if the evidence
supports a conclusion that the original public meaning of a term or phrase was so
limited. But the evidence, which I consider overwhelming,38 that the original
meaning of the right to keep and bear arms was of the same individualistic nature as
the individual rights of speech, press, and assembly, is simply inadequate to draw
such lines.
As with the First Amendment’s protection of the “freedom of speech,” the
proper approach to this problem is to identify the right, in this case the individual’s
right to possess and carry weapons, including firearms. This will lead to the
conclusion that complete bans on firearms in common use for individual and
collective self defense are unconstitutional, and likely other conclusions as well. But
then one must acknowledge that, like the right of freedom of speech, this protected
liberty – like all liberty – may be reasonably regulated, provided that such regulations
are not unduly burdening the right or serving as a mere pretext for restricting it
exercise. The way this was done historically was to realistically assess regulations
of liberty to see if they were irrational, arbitrary or discriminatory.
Because we are dealing with a fundamental right, we cannot accept the
legislatures word or even its good faith, the approach of modern “rational basis”
scrutiny. A more realistic assessment is required. So when considering, for example,
the constitutionality of bans on so-called military-style assault weapons, or
restrictions on the capacity of magazines, the Court should ask, at minimum, whether
these or other measures are actually rational – to articulate the end they are seeking
to accomplish, then assesses whether the means adopted actually match up with the
purported end. Would they actually have prevented a mass shooting or ameliorated
real crimes?
36

See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 14-15 (2012). For a response, see Solum, supra note 12, at ___.
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Alternatively, he can rely on stare decisis. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989) (“almost every originalist would adulterate it with the
doctrine of stare decisis”). For my criticism of this approach, see Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity:
A Critique of Faint-Hearted Originalism, 73 CINC. L. REV. 7 (2006).
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See Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an
Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237 (2004).
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This heightened “rationality review” could help ensure that the reason being
articulated is the real reason for the law. For example, “assault weapons” are a
made-up category of weapons that is based solely on cosmetic features that make
them look like the fully automatic weapons used by the military. Banning them
leaves other rifles that are functionally identical in their lethality and rate of fire
completely legal. Moreover, far more powerful hunting rifles are left untouched by
the law, as are shotguns. This is simply irrational and therefore unconstitutional.
Deciding on the appropriate kind and degree of scrutiny of laws purporting
to reasonably regulate the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right is a matter,
not of interpretation, but of construction. Whether the exemptions listed by Justice
Scalia are actually reasonable or rational, follows from the constructions the Court
adopts to protect the abstract rights that are identified by the original meaning of the
text.
B. Contending with Precedent: McDonald v. Chicago
In Heller, the Court was writing on a relatively clean slate. Only a single
case, Miller, had any bearing on the meaning of the text of the Second Amendment.
By contrast, when the Court was called upon to decide whether the individual right
to keep and bear arms applied to the states, the Court needed to confront whether to
reverse a precedent of long-standing vintage: The Slaughter-House Cases,39 which
had greatly limited to scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because of this and other Nineteenth Century cases, when the Court
later decided to apply most of the rights contained in the first ten amendments to the
states, it did so via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
There is a widespread academic consensus that the original meaning of the
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” included at least the
personal guarantees enumerated in the first eight amendments.40 In City of Chicago
v. McDonald,41 when answering the question of whether the individual right to keep
and bear arms that it had identified in Heller applied as well to the states, the Court
faced a choice of whether to expressly adhere to this original meaning or, instead,
apply its later doctrine by which it “incorporates” into the Due Process Clause of the

39

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
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No one has been more influential in sparking this consensus than Michael Kent Curtis. See
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1986).
41

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010).
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Fourteenth Amendment, those rights it deems to be deeply rooted in the tradition and
history of the American people. The original meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was urged by petitioners as the proper basis of the decision in its
brief and at oral argument, and in this claim it was supported by amici. Despite this,
in McDonald, a plurality of four justices, including the self-described originalist
Justice Scalia, opted to follow precedent rather than original meaning and apply the
doctrine of substantive due process.
Still, McDonald illustrates the gravitational force of originalism. For one
thing, the key fifth vote, provided by Justice Thomas, was entirely based on original
meaning.42 Justice Thomas refused to join the plurality opinion based on precedent
to constitute a majority for that position. Secondly, as Justice Thomas demonstrated,
the conclusion reached by the plurality was entirely consistent with the original
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. McDonald is not, therefore, a case
where a majority of the Court was willing to contradict the original meaning of the
text by relying on stare decisis. Thirdly, Justice Alito’s majority opinion did not
reject originalism, but instead asserted its agnosticism:
The municipal respondents and some of their amici ... contend that the
phrase ‘privileges or immunities’ is not naturally read to mean the rights set
out in the first eight Amendments.... A number of scholars have found
support for the total incorporation of the Bill of Rights.... We take no
position with respect to this academic debate.43

For these three reasons, although the plurality in McDonald did not choose to decide
the case on the basis of original meaning, that meaning could be said to have exerted
a gravitational force on the outcome.
In one important respect, however, the plurality’s decision did represent a fear
of adhering to original meaning. At oral argument it became clear that members of
the plurality were concerned about where adopting the original meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause might lead. In particular, they were apparently
concerned that the scope of this meaning might include the protection of some
unenumerated rights. For example, during rebuttal, Justice Alito asked pointedly
whether the original meaning of “Privileges or Immunities” included “the right to
contract” – a not-so-subtle reference to the liberty of contract protected by the Court
in Lochner v. New York.44

42

See 130 S.Ct. at 3058-59 (Thomas, J. concurring).

43

130 S. Ct. at 3033 n. 10 (Alito, J.).

44

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 64, McDonald, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521) (“Well,
does it include the right to contract? . . . Isn’t that an unenumerated right?”) (question by Alito, J.).
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That the plurality was willing to stick with its substantive due process
precedent can be explained by its belief that it had sufficiently limited, indeed
neutered, that doctrine with the approach it adopted in Glucksberg,45 so it was far
safer to apply that test to the right to keep and bear arms than it was to open a
potential can of worms by adhering the original meaning of the text.46 In short, it was
precisely because the original meaning of the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States was both sufficiently definite and objectionable to the members of
the plurality – as it was to the four dissenters for similar reasons – that the plurality
decided to stick with precedent.
Still, as was noted above, the plurality could not bring itself to repudiate
original meaning and, indeed, it relied upon it at crucial parts of its opinion. It did
so, however, by bowdlerizing its sources to read that the right to arms was protected
by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole, rather than by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in particular. For example, Justice Alito wrote that
“Senator Jacob Howard, who spoke on behalf of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction and sponsored the Amendment in the Senate, stated that the
Amendment protected all of ‘the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first
eight amendments of the Constitution.’”47 In fact, in this speech, Senator Howard
was expressly explaining the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the
proposed amendment. “To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be
– for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature
– to these should be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first
eight amendments of the Constitution.”48
Likewise, Justice Alito wrote that “Representative John Bingham, the
principal author of the text of §1, said that the Amendment would ‘arm the Congress
. . . with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution
today.’”49 Like Howard, however, Bingham was explaining the meaning of
“privileges or immunities.” Indeed, when he made the statement quoted by Justice
Alito on February 28th, Bingham was defending a precursor to the Fourteenth
45

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).

46

For my critique of the is approach to protecting fundamental rights, see Randy E. Barnett,
Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008) (describing and criticizing the “Glucksberg TwoStep”).
47

130 S. Ct. at 3033, n. 9 (Alito, J.) (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2765 (1866)
(Emphasis added).
48

See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 2765 (May 23, 1866).
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130 S. Ct. at 3033 n. 9 (Alito, J.) (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1088)
(Emphasis added).
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Amendment that read: “The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states....”50
But this sort of faint-hearted originalism is nothing new. Indeed, the term
“faint-hearted originalist” was coined by Justice Scalia himself in an essay in which
he identified not just one, but several circumstances in which he would abstain from
following original meaning.51 And Justice Scalia is not alone in this regard. Even
many originalist scholars claim that precedent, or stare decisis, should trump original
meaning under certain circumstances.
While I am on record disagreeing with Justice Scalia,52 and with those who
would allow stare decisis to trump originalism,53 this is a debate within originalism
and among originalists.
C. Originalism in the Background: Sebelius v. NFIB
I was one of the lawyers representing the National Federation of Independent
Business in its constitutional challenge to Affordable Care Act (ACA). Before that
I had filed with the Cato Institute amicus briefs in all the other major challenges to
the ACA. In none of the briefs to which I was a party did we assert the original
meaning of the Commerce or Necessary and Proper Clauses as a basis for the
decision in the case. Nor did we contest the constitutionality of the various mandates
that the Act imposed on insurance companies despite my own belief that the
Affordable Care Act’s regulation of insurance contracts exceeded the original
meaning of these Congressional powers.54 We did not do so because we believed that
the Court would have considered itself bound by its 1944 precedent in South-Eastern
Underwriters in which it held that contracts for insurance can be regulated by
Congress under the Commerce Clause.55
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Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1088 (February 28, 1866).
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See Scalia, supra note 36.
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See Randy E. Barnett, supra note 36.
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See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent With Original Meaning: Not As Radical as it
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENTARY 257 (2005); and Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It's a Plane, No, It's
Super-Precedent: A Reply to Farber and Gerhard, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1232 (2006).
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Though it is. See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual
Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. OF L. & LIBERTY 581, 583-87 (2010)
(discussing the original meaning of the Commerce Clause).
55

See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).

Randy E. Barnett

Gravitational Force of Originalism

Page 20

Instead, we contended that the assertion of a power to compel that individuals
engage in economic activity, so that Congress may then regulate it, was
unprecedented and, therefore, was unjustified by existing precedents. And we argued
that the individual insurance mandate was an improper means for Congress to
execute its commerce power over insurance companies. Given that original meaning
was not even asserted by the parties, it is no surprise that the opinions of both Chief
Justice Roberts and the four dissenting justices did not rely on original meaning per
se. Instead, these five justices accepted our contention that the power to mandate
economic activity was unprecedented, and that it did not fall under the Commerce
Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Rather than assert and rely upon original meaning, these five justices stuck
with the New Federalism of the Rehnquist Court, or what my colleague Lawrence
Solum has dubbed a “constitutional gestalt.”56 The New Federalism of the Rehnquist
Court did not question the existence of what law professors call “the New Deal
Settlement.” But it did reject the prevailing constitutional gestalt among law
professors that the New Deal and Warren Courts “settled” that Congress has a
plenary power over the national economy, subject only to whatever express
prohibitions are found in the Constitution and, perhaps, some additional
unenumerated fundamental rights. Or put another way, that the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses together amount to a National Problems Power in
Congress.
In contrast, according to the Rehnquist Court, although all the powers that
were approved by the New Deal and Warren Courts are now to be taken as
constitutional and are to be upheld as “settled” precedents, any claim of additional
new powers still needs to be justified. Put another way, the expansion of
congressional power authorized by the New Deal and Warren Courts established a
new high water mark of constitutional power. Going any higher than this requires
special justification.
This constitutional gestalt can be summarized as “this far and no farther” –
provided “no farther” is not taken as an absolute but merely as establishing a baseline
beyond which serious justification is needed.57 As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed
in Morrison, “thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where the activity is economic in

56

See Lawrence B. Solum, The Legal Effects of NFIB v. Sebelius and the Constitutional
Gestalt (Georgetown Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 12-152) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152653.
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For a similar assessment of the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism, see John Valauri,
Baffled by Inactivity: The Individual Mandate and the Commerce Power, 10 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
51, 63 (2112) (describing the “thus far method and justification of constitutional line drawing”).
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nature.”58 This is why the general acceptance of our claim that the individual
insurance mandate was unprecedented was so crucial to the unexpected legal success
we enjoyed. Accepting our claim that the mandate was unprecedented placed the
burden of justification on the government.
Which brings me to a second tenet of the constitutional gestalt of the New
Federalism: Any purported justification that would lead to an unlimited reading of
Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers would improperly contradict what, in United
States v. Lopez,59 Chief Justice Rehnquist identified as the “first principles” of our
constitutional law. In what has become a famous passage, he wrote:
We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8. As James Madison
wrote: “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45.... This
constitutionally mandated division of authority “was adopted by the
Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.” Gregory v.
Ashcroft.... “Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of
excessive power in anyone branch, a healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front.” Ibid.60

This is why the claim that “health care is a national problem” and other similar
rationales offered by the government and many law professors fell on five deaf ears.
All these rationales, if accepted, would lead to a national police power qualified only
by the Bill of Rights (as are state police powers). And this was contrary to the
constitutional gestalt of the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism.
As I explain elsewhere,61 I believe the reason why so many law professors
missed the boat on how the claims would be decided is that many have not
appreciated this alternative reading of the New Deal settlement adopted by the
Rehnquist Court. Because of this, these professors think that the only alternative to
their constitutional gestalt is a return to the pre-New Deal gestalt of holding Congress
to the original meaning of its powers under Article I, Section 8, a course they are
58

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
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properly confident there are not five votes to take.
Others have rationalized the distinction in Lopez and Morrison between
“economic” and “noneconomic” activity as identifying the outer boundary of the
plenary power over national economic regulation. In other words, they have
internalized this distinction within their constitutional gestalt. They read Lopez and
Morrison as generally consistent with the pre-existing view of the New Deal
settlement.
Still others may have thought that whatever alternative gestalt was implicit
in the New Federalism was abandoned by the Court in the Raich case when Justices
Kennedy and Scalia voted to uphold the Controlled Substances Act. Morever, two
of the three Justices in the dissent in Raich had been replaced by Justices with little
or no pre-existing commitment to finding any limits on the enumerated powers of
Congress, leaving only Justice Thomas to be open to the argument that the individual
mandate exceeded the powers of Congress.
If you held any of these views, the challenge to the individual insurance
mandate was an easy case for you. After all, the Affordable Care Act was a
comprehensive scheme to regulate the national economy. The individual insurance
mandate was easily characterized as both necessary to this scheme and did not violate
any express prohibition of the Constitution. End of story. Moreover, anyone who
suggested anything to the contrary was advocating the undoing of the New Deal
Settlement and a return to the bad old pre-New Deal constitutional gestalt of the evil
Lochner Era, for which there were not five votes on the Court.
All of this missed, first, the possibility that the Rehnquist Court’s New
Federalism represented an alternate constitutional gestalt of “this far and no farther”
without a justification that would undermine the enumerated powers scheme and,
second, that there might still be five Justices on the Court who subscribed to this
gestalt.
Assuming you accept my description of the Rehnquist Court's constitutional
gestalt, however, you may well object: Why this far and no farther? Why draw the
line at this point? Isn’t this arbitrary? Besides, where is all this in the Constitution?
Law professors said the same thing about the economic-noneconomic activity line
the Court drew in Lopez v. United States. Why draw that line? Where is that line in
the text of the Constitution?
Here is where I think the growth of originalism since the 1980s enters the
picture. Unlike the Heller case which was argued and decided on originalist grounds,
in our challenge to the ACA we made no originalist claims whatsoever. But the
original meaning of the Constitution still played a role because it lies behind the
Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism exerting a gravitational force that we can see now
extends to the Roberts Court too.
Simply put, the role played by originalism is this: During the New Deal era,
Americans acquiesced to an enormous expansion of federal power and the Supreme
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Court eventually expanded its interpretation of federal power accordingly. This
expansion is now settled precedent. But with respect to the Article I, Section 8
powers of Congress, the powers upheld by the New Deal and Warren Courts violated
the original meaning of the Constitution and this expansion was, therefore,
illegitimate on originalist grounds. Because of this, any further expansion must be
justified, and any purported justification that would essentially eliminate the
enumerated powers scheme in the original Constitution is unacceptable or improper.
Until NFIB, we could not be certain whether the Raich case represented a
repudiation of the “this far and no farther” approach of the New Federalism (though
I believed there were strong hints in both Comstock62 and Bond63 that a majority had
not abandoned the constitutional gestalt of the Rehnquist Court). NIFB v. Sebelius
is significant, therefore, because it shows that the Rehnquist Court’s constitutional
gestalt of this far and no farther still has five votes in the Roberts Court. And it does,
I believe, at least in part because of the gravitational force of originalism, a force that
can affect even constitutional decisions and doctrines that are not expressly justified
on the basis of original public meaning.
CONCLUSION
The claim that originalism exerts a gravitational force on the Supreme Court’s
doctrine is obviously contestable. Other explanations of the doctrines and decisions
I have discussed are possible. And, even if true, I am hardly claiming that
originalism’s gravitational force is irresistible. Obviously, it was not strong enough
to reverse either the Slaughter-House Cases or South-Eastern Underwriters, much
less Darby,64 Jones & Laughlin Steel,65 or Wickard,66 although it might well have
been powerful enough to keep even the New Deal Court from expressly adopting the
view that Congress has a plenary power over the “national economy” or a National
Problems Power.67 After all, though the gravitational force of the Sun is not strong
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enough to cause the earth to plunge into its fiery depths, it is still powerful enough
to keep the Earth in its orbit.
Of course, the gravitational force of originalism is dependent in part on the
current composition of the Court. A lot will depend on future retirements, future
elections, and the future intellectual debates over the proper method of constitutional
interpretation. If another Justice Breyer replaces one of the more conservative five,
we can expect that gravitational force to diminish greatly. But I would not expect it
to disappear altogether. The Supreme Court has rarely in its history expressly
repudiated original meaning. Perhaps the closest it came to this was in The
Minnesota Mortgage Case.68 Pledging adherence to the original meaning of the text,
as Justice Stevens did in Heller, while allowing other considerations like precedent
to take priority, as Justice Scalia did in McDonald, is the homage that vice pays to
virtue. Even that is a force to be reckoned with.

I suspect what we would say is that in any case where Congress things there is an effect on interstate
commerce, the Court will accept that judgment. When we admit that it is an economic matter, we
pretty much nearly admit that it is not a matter which courts may judge.” Id. at 221. Yet, a majority
of the Court has never actually said this. Such reticence may be attributed the gravitational force of
originalism.
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